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Deliberation Welcomes Prediction 
Alan Hájek1 
 
Tonight you will face the pleasant choice of having either red wine or white 
wine with your dinner. Perhaps you have subjective probabilities now for what 
you will end up choosing, or perhaps not. But a number of authors claim that 
once you begin deliberating about this choice, you cannot have such 
probabilities, on pain of irrationality. I disagree. 
Let me approach this debate in stages. 
 
1. Satellite view 
Start with some propositional attitude. Are there propositions to which this 
attitude cannot be held, or at least cannot rationally be held? Are there gaps for 
the attitude, of necessity, or on pain of irrationality? I’ll be especially interested 
in the (ir)rationality question; but of course, if there are propositions to which an 
attitude cannot be held simplicter, then it cannot rationally be held. It’s 
especially interesting if there are true propositions to which the attitude cannot 
rationally be held.  
For example, let the attitude be knowledge. Are there propositions—even true 
ones2—that cannot be known? According to Fitch’s paradox, there are. Its 
upshot is that, necessarily, if in fact there is an unknown truth—and there surely 
is—then there is a truth that cannot be known. Or let the attitude be belief. Are 
there propositions that cannot rationally be believed? According to Moore’s 
paradox, there are—propositions of the form 
p & I believe that not p 
or 
p & I don’t believe that p. 																																																								
1 For very helpful discussion and comments I thank especially Brad Armendt, Paul Bartha, J.C. 
Bjerring, Rachael Briggs, James Chase, John Collins, Nick DiBella, Kenny Easwaran, Edward 
Elliott, Caspar Hare, Brian Hedden, Yoaav Isaacs, Leon Leontyev, Isaac Levi, Hanti Lin, Aidan 
Lyon, Philip Pettit, Huw Price, Alex Pruss, Wolfgang Schwarz, Dan Singer, and Katia Vavova; 
and audiences at the University of Maryland Probability Workshop (organized by Aidan Lyon), 
the University of Pennsylvania, Oxford University, Arizona State University, Georgia State 
University, the Self-Prediction and Decision conference, Cambridge University (organized by 
Arif Ahmed and Huw Price), the Episteme conference, Phuket (organized by Jennifer Lackey), 
and the Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, Macquarie University. Further 
thanks to Katia Vavova for her insightful comments on this paper (this volume). 
2 Of course, false propositions cannot be known, since knowledge is factive. 
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Fitch's paradox and Moore's paradox give us, respectively, knowledge blindspots 
and belief blindspots, in Sorensen’s (1988) term. He argues that there are 
more—e.g. in the surprise exam paradox (‘I will receive a surprise exam this 
week’) and propositions concerning the sharp boundaries of vague predicates. 
Subjective probabilities—credences—are important, and perhaps even 
fundamental propositional attitudes. Are there rational credence blindspots—
propositions to which one cannot rationally assign credences? As we will soon 
see, several authors think that there is an interesting and easily characterised 
class of such propositions. 
 
2. Aerial view 
I have long been interested in probability gaps. (My favourite examples have 
included non-measurable sets and chance gaps—see, for instance, my 2003.) If 
there are any such gaps for subjective probabilities, they are problematic for a 
number of pillars in Bayesian epistemology: 
 
Conditional probability  
I have campaigned for many years against the usual understanding of 
conditional probability as given by the ratio formula: 
P(A | B) = P(A & B)/P(B), provided P(B) > 0. 
(See especially my 2003.) One of my main arguments is from probability gaps. 
Let G be such a gap for P—that is, P(G) is undefined. Nevertheless, various 
conditional probabilities involving G should be defined. For example, the 
conditional probability of G, given G, should be 1; and the conditional 
probability of not-G, given G, should be 0. The usual understanding founders on 
such cases, since the terms in the ratio are undefined. 
 
Conditionalization 
We may immediately parlay this argument against the ratio formula for 
conditional probability into an argument against conditionalization, which is 
standardly defined in terms of this formula. Conditionalization is the Bayesian’s 
favored rule for updating credences. Suppose that initially your probability 
function is P. Now suppose that you learn a piece of evidence E, and that this is 
your total evidence. Your new probability function is supposedly given by: 
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 For all X, Pnew(X) = P(X | E), provided P(E) > 0  (Conditionalization) 
But the proviso fails if E was a probability gap for you before you learned it. We 
thus cannot model your becoming certain of such a gap by (Conditionalization). 
We will return to this thought later. (A similar point carries over to Jeffrey 
conditionalization, which models less decisive learning experiences in which 
one's probabilities across a partition are revised. Again, the ratio formula is 
usually assumed for the requisite conditional probabilities. See Jeffrey 1983.) 
 
Decision theory 
Decision theory’s central notion is that of expected utility, a measure of the 
choiceworthiness of an option: the weighted average of the utilities associated 
with that option in each possible state of the world, the weights given by 
corresponding probabilities that those states are realized. The theory’s mantra is 
that rational action maximises expected utility. Let G be a probability gap for 
you. Now consider these options: 
Option 1: You get $1,000,000 if G, nothing otherwise. 
Option 2: You get nothing. 
You should clearly choose Option 1. But its expected utility is undefined, since 
the probability of G is undefined; so choosing Option 1 does not maximise 
expected utility.  
 
Independence 
Independence is a key concept in probability theory. When two propositions 
are independent, the truth of one of them is completely uninformative about the 
truth of the other, probabilistically speaking. Probability textbooks say that A 
and B are independent just in case  
P(A & B) = P(A)P(B). 
But what are we to say about probability gaps, for which the corresponding 
equation fails to hold? After all, if P(G) is undefined, then P(G)P(X) is 
undefined, for all X. If we say that propositions that are not independent are 
dependent, then we have the absurdity that G is dependent on every proposition. 
If we say that there is no verdict either way when any of the terms in the 
equation are undefined, then we will have silences where we want answers. For 
example, every proposition with probability less than one should turn out to be 
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dependent on itself (the truth of the proposition could not be more informative 
about its own truth!). But this account of independence cannot say this. 
 
Regularity 
Commonsense says, and many philosophers agree,3 that some version of so-
called regularity should hold: 
If X is possible, then the probability of X is positive. 
Versions of regularity as a constraint or condition on subjective probabilities 
have been proposed by Kemeny (1955), Shimony (1955, 1970), Jeffreys (1961), 
Edwards et al. (1963), Carnap (1963), Stalnaker (1970), Lewis (1980), Skyrms 
(1980), Appiah (1985), Jackson (1987), Jeffrey (1992), Benci et al. (2013). Of 
course, different senses of ‘possible’ give us different senses of regularity. But 
whichever sense we might favor, probability gaps will provide counterexamples. 
For if G is possible in the requisite sense, but the probability of G is undefined, 
then it is not the case that the probability of X is positive. 
So it goes. Credence gaps wreak havoc for various foundational notions in 
probability theory, and thus in formal epistemology. So it is especially important 
if there is an interesting class of credence gaps for a rational agent.  
And a number of prominent authors think exactly that. It is time to get in the 
trenches with them. 
 
3. The ‘deliberation crowds out prediction’ thesis 
Here is their view: 
While deliberating about what you’ll do, you cannot rationally have 
credences for what you’ll do. 
For example, suppose that you are deliberating about whether to have red or 
white wine with your meal. According to the view, you cannot rationally assign 
credences to these options. You cannot assign probability ½ to each of them; you 
cannot assign 2/3 to red and 1/3 to white (reflecting a partial inclination towards 
red); and so on. And so it is with all decisions, while you are in the process of 
deliberating about them. To be sure, other agents may be able to rationally 
assign credences to what you will choose. The problem is supposedly one of 																																																								
3 I disagree, for reasons given in my "Staying Regular?" (MS). 
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assigning credences reflexively—a ‘first-person’ problem. One cannot have 
credences for one’s own options while deliberating—for short, option-
credences—on pain of irrationality. In a slogan, the thesis is that option-
credences are irrational. 
This has come to be known as the ‘deliberation crowds out prediction’ thesis 
(following Levi 1997). At the risk of quibbling about terminology, I think that 
‘prediction’ is normally used to connote a forecast or prophecy of a specific 
event. We often assign credences to things without making predictions (so 
understood). I assign credence 1/1,000,000 to each of the million tickets winning 
tomorrow’s lottery, but I don’t make any predictions regarding the winner. On 
the contrary—my uniform probability distribution reflects my lack of prediction. 
According to the thesis, deliberation doesn't crowd out just prediction (in the 
sense of a forecast, or a prophecy), but any assignment of credences to one's 
options. So I will give the thesis another name. I will call it the DARC Thesis: 
Deliberation Annihilates Reflexive Credences.4 
Versions of the DARC Thesis have been advocated by authors such as Spohn, 
Levi, Gilboa, Price, Louise, and others. Spohn and Gilboa couch their versions 
of the Thesis especially in terms of modeling credences: we should not model 
rational agents as assigning option-credences. Nevertheless, I take them to 
subscribe to the DARC Thesis. For example, Spohn (1977) writes: “probably 
anyone will find it absurd to assume that someone has subjective probabilities 




4. Initial concerns about the DARC Thesis 
Before examining various arguments for the DARC Thesis, let me register 
some concerns about it.  
Firstly, when we are deliberating about what we will do, we are uncertain 
about what we will do; probability is our best theory of uncertainty; so offhand, 
we should assign probabilities to what we will do—or at least, we may. The 
Thesis is by no means a natural default position; quite the opposite. 																																																								
4 Thanks to Jessica Isserow for suggesting the 'A' in this acronym! 
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Secondly, the DARC Thesis imposes a new constraint on credences beyond 
the usual Bayesian ones that they obey the probability calculus and are revised 
by conditionalization. This is big news for Bayesianism, and if true, it should be 
written in neon lights. More than that, it seems to contradict orthodox 
Bayesianism. Consider a case in which initially you idly contemplate a decision 
that you will make some time in the future; time passes, and eventually the time 
to make the decision arrives, and you begin deliberating about it; then, finally, 
you have made your decision. It is perfectly compatible with the DARC Thesis 
that at the initial and final times, you have credences for what you will do; 
indeed, various proponents of the Thesis explicitly say that there is nothing 
problematic about such credences. It is only during the intermediate period while 
you are deliberating that the credences are forbidden. So suppose that you have 
credences for your options outside that period. Then we have two revisions of 
your probability function: your credences for your options suddenly vanish when 
your deliberation commences, and they suddenly appear when it ends. Neither 
revision takes place by conditionalization. This is inconsistent with the Bayesian 
orthodoxy that credences should be revised by conditionalization (or Jeffrey 
conditionalization). In fact, it is inconsistent with even the weaker claim that 
credences may be revised only on the basis of evidence (however such revision 
should take place). Not only are option-credences rationally permitted by these 
lights—they are rationally required. 
Thirdly, and relatedly, the DARC Thesis conflicts with the Reflection 
Principle (van Fraassen 1984, 1995). According to Reflection, your credence in 
X at a time should be your expectation of your credences in X at any later time. 
Suppose that now you have not yet begun deliberating about the wine to 
accompany your dinner, and that you assign a credence to your choosing the red 
wine that evening—say, ½; no conflict with the DARC Thesis yet. Suppose also 
that you believe that you will be deliberating about the choice of wine at 7 pm. 
According to the DARC Thesis, your credence for red wine should be undefined 
then, so your expectation of your 7 pm credences for red wine should be 
undefined now. But your credence now is ½, not undefined, in violation of 
Reflection.  
	 7	
Fourthly, it seems clear to me that you can make comparative probability 
judgments about your options. 7 pm arrives, and you are in the thick of your 
wine deliberations. You judge that you are more likely to have red wine with 
your dinner than to have red wine with your dinner followed by port with your 
dessert, and this in turn is more likely than your having a shot of petrol. (The 
quirky restaurant you’re at offers all these options.) And I don’t see why 
numerical probabilities create any special problem. Comparative probabilities 
over your options may be especially apt when deliberation about them takes 
place over a long period of time, and things change during that time. Suppose 
that you are choosing between two job offers at two universities, but the decision 
is complicated, drawn out, and you must weigh many factors. Then the dean at 
one of the universities suddenly increases your salary—one of the factors—by 
$10,000. It is natural for your probability of taking that university’s offer to 
suddenly be greater than it was, even if your deliberation is not yet over. This 
cannot be squared with the DARC Thesis. More generally, when you deliberate 
about your options, you weigh in turn the pros and cons of each of them. As a 
pro (con) regarding an option comes to your attention, it is natural for your 
probability of choosing it to increase (decrease). 
Fifthly, consider a Perry/Lewis-style ‘de se’ ignorance case, in which you 
have a lot of evidence regarding an agent’s decision situation, but you are 
uncertain who the agent is. You know a lot about their options, their utility 
function, their behavioral dispositions, and so on, and on that basis form 
credences about what they will choose. Then, you suddenly discover their 
identity: the agent is you! It seems odd that your credences should suddenly 
vanish.  
Or suppose that there are two agents whose decision situations you are 
contemplating, and you know that one of the agents is you, but you are not sure 
who it is; you assign credence ½ to each of them being you.5 (This is rather like 
the predicament of the Gods in Lewis's famous case (1979, 520-521).) 
According to the DARC Thesis, you cannot assign credences to both their 
choices, for in doing so, you will certainly assign a credence to your own choice. 
Yet by symmetry, you have no basis for assigning credence to one's choice but 																																																								
5 Thanks to Yoaav Isaacs for this case, and for those of the next paragraph. 
	 8	
not the other. That leaves only your assigning credences to neither of their 
choices. The DARC thesis ramifies, then, to your credences about the choices of 
agents besides yourself, somewhat surprisingly. 
But this is only the beginning. Now suppose that you give unequal credence 
to each of the agents being you—say, 0.999 and 0.001. If you assign credences 
to the options of the agent who is in fact you, you sin against the DARC 
Thesis—even though you may have no way of figuring out this fact. This 
imposes an oddly externalist constraint on you. It seems that the only way that 
you can be sure of upholding the DARC Thesis is to withhold assigning 
credences to the options of both agents. The problem only gets worse when there 
are multiple agents who could be you, for all you know, however heavily your 
credences are biased towards one candidate. Indeed, such cases need not be far-
fetched: when faced with a decision problem, and any uncertainty about whether 
that problem is yours or someone else's, this predicament is yours. But 
rationality may require of you at least some uncertainty about that! The DARC 
thesis ramifies still further.  
Sixthly, and more generally, there will often be downstream consequences of 
the DARC Thesis for other propositions. I may believe or assign high credence 
to biconditionals between what I choose and other propositions. Suppose that I 
am deliberating between going to Italy and going to Iraq for a holiday, and I 
believe that my wife will be worried if and only if I go to Iraq. By the DARC 
Thesis, I cannot have a credence for ‘my wife will be worried’—if I did, it 
would fix my credence for ‘I go to Iraq’ at the same value.  
Or suppose that I believe a biconditional between something I am deliberating 
about now, and something I am not. I am choosing between having pizza and 
Chinese for dinner. Today is Tuesday, and Tuesdays are two-for-one pizza 
nights at my local pub. I believe that however I choose tonight, I will choose the 
same way next Tuesday. Indeed, I may believe this in virtue of my rationality: 
my reasons for one choice or the other will be the same then as now (we may 
suppose). By the DARC Thesis, I had better not have a credence for next week’s 
choice. 
Or suppose that I have a twin, faced with the same decision problem as I have, 
and I believe that however he chooses, so will I. By the DARC Thesis, I had 
better not have a credence for how he chooses. And these "sixthly" points carry 
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over even if there is merely a correlation between the relevant propositions, by 
my lights. For example, if I assign a credence to 'my wife will be worried', that 
will still constrain my credence in ‘I go to Iraq’; likewise for the later cases. 
Similarly, probabilities propagate through entailments, so the DARC Thesis 
prohibits various credence assignments to consequences of one’s options. ‘I’ll go 
to Italy for a holiday’ entails ‘I’ll go somewhere for a holiday’. If I assign 
credence less than 1 to the latter, that puts an upper bound on my credence for 
the former. For example, if I assign probability 0.9 to my going somewhere for a 
holiday, then my probability for going to Italy for a holiday is bounded above by 
that value. In that case ‘I’ll go to Italy for a holiday’ is not a probability gap for 
me; at worst, my probability for it is an interval from 0 to 0.9. Then by the 
DARC Thesis, I must not assign credence less than 1 to ‘I’ll go somewhere for a 
holiday’, while deliberating about whether I’ll go to Italy. 
To be sure, proponents of the DARC Thesis can embrace all these 
downstream consequences: indeed, they may say, I should not assign credence to 
my wife’s worrying, or to next Tuesday’s choice, or to my twin’s choice, or 
credence less than 1 to my going somewhere for a holiday. Still, we should be 
clear that the DARC Thesis ramifies to propositions about which I am not 
currently deliberating. Probability gaps are even more widespread. 
Presumably it also ramifies to other propositional attitudes. Credence has 
various connections to other attitudes—belief, knowledge, and desire most 
obviously, but also hoping, wishing, dreading, fearing, and so on. I opened with 
a brief discussion of some examples of blindspots for knowledge and belief. 
Presumably the DARC thesis, if true, would furnish us with more blindspots, for 
these attitudes and others. 
Be all that as it may, the DARC Thesis has much currency. If true, it would 
provide a rich source of probability gaps, in which I have indicated my long-
standing interest. And there is nothing esoteric about these putative gaps—no 
fancy mathematics (such as the existence of non-measurable sets) or fancy 
metaphysics (such as the existence of chance gaps) is needed. Propositions such 
as ‘I will order red wine’ or ‘I will go to Italy for a holiday’ could hardly be 
more mundane. Yet if they are probability gaps, they are problematic for various 
foundations of probability theory and formal epistemology—recall my ‘aerial 
view’ of some of them in the previous section. The stakes are high. 
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5. Arguments for the DARC Thesis 
I will now rehearse and rebut many of the main arguments for the DARC 
Thesis in the literature. I will group them according to their main themes: agency 
(arguments 1 – 4), vacuity (5), betting (6 and 7), and decision-theoretical 
considerations (8). 
 
5.1 Wishy-washy agency/free will argument-sketches 
I will begin with more of a gesture at an argument for the DARC Thesis than 
an argument per se. I have informally discussed the Thesis with many 
philosophers, a number of whom are sympathetic to it. When I press them for 
arguments, I often get a response that I will parody as follows:  
Say some vague things about ‘agency’.  
Wave hands at ‘free will’. 
(Perhaps drop in a passing reference to Kant.)  
Therefore, the DARC Thesis. 
Even the published literature in favor of the Thesis has some moments like this. 
To be sure, there is something seductive about the idea that the very nature of 
free agency somehow precludes the assignment of rational credences to its 
upshots. 
Needless to say, such a wishy-washy argument-sketch has to be filled in more 
before it is worthy of serious attention. But even in this inchoate form, we 
should be on the alert. For even this argument-sketch risks proving too much. 
The vague things said about ‘agency’ and the hands waved at ‘free will’ (and the 
passing reference to Kant) seem to apply just as readily in the third-person case 
as in the first-person case. When onlookers assign credences to my choices, they 
presumably regard me as an agent with free will. Yet there is not supposed to be 
anything problematic about such credences. Similarly, I may assign credences to 
my future choices when I am not deliberating about them—as it might be, next 
Tuesday’s meal options—well aware that I will be a free agent then.  
And I can also wave my hands, to the opposite conclusion. Free will may all 
the more ground one's option-credences. More on that shortly. 
It is all to the good, then, that some authors fill in more this argument-sketch, 
giving arguments worthy of serious attention. I turn to them now. 
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5.2 There is no evidence for how an agent will choose from her own 
perspective (Price) 
Huw Price (2007, 11) wants to distance himself from Pearl’s view “that there is 
evidence [regarding how actors will choose] but that actors should ignore it”. Price 
continues: “whereas the point should be that there isn’t evidence in the first place, 
from the actor’s own perspective.” He is inspired by Ramsey (1978, 146): "any 
possible present volition of ours is (for us) irrelevant to any past event. To another 
(or to ourselves in the future) it can serve as a sign of the past, but to us now what 
we do affects only the probability of the future ... In a sense my present action is 
an ultimate and the only ultimate contingency." 
Let me spell out what I take Price's argument to be in a bit more detail: 
1.  While deliberating, you have no evidence for how you will choose.  
2.  (Tacit) Your credences should reflect your evidence. 
Conclusion: You should have no credence for how you will choose. 
I have added premise 2, as some sort of bridge between evidence and rational 
credence (or lack thereof) is required. 
I reply: 
Premise 1   
You typically have evidence regarding how you will choose—for example, 
your past choices in similar situations, or the choices of people similar to you in 
similar situations. Indeed, you typically have better evidence—not worse, let 
alone none—than onlookers do regarding your choice: the evidence of your own 
volition, too. Introspective evidence about your own volition provides more 
basis for the assignment of credences that you might use, beyond publically 
available information that others may unproblematically use. Following Joyce 
(2002), we may go so far as to say that your volition trumps (screens off) such 
information: it generates its own evidence. You get to make the news, and you 
get to know it ahead of everyone else. (More on this in §5.3.) It seems odd that 
they may assign credences to what you will choose, but you may not, when your 
evidential basis is superior to theirs. 
We might even be able to say more about the nature of the extra evidence that 
you have at your disposal: for example, it might be a slight inclination to choose 
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one way rather than another, a 'tickle' that you can introspect, but that nobody 
else can detect. 
 
Premise 2   
Let's grant that your credences should reflect your evidence (in some sense); but 
they should also reflect your priors. And there is no difficulty with your 
assigning prior probabilities to what you will end up choosing, long before you 
face the moment of choice. In any case, perhaps option-credences are exceptions 
to premise 2; perhaps they give rise to a non-evidential way to have rational 
credences.6 
 
The validity of the argument   
Grant the premises for the sake of the argument. Does it follow that you should 
have no credence for how you will choose? Perhaps; but proponents of the 
Principle of Indifference will insist that, on the contrary, your lack of evidence 
forces certain credences on you.7 To be sure, the Principle has hit hard times; for 
example, many authors think that Bertrand’s paradoxes decisively refute it. Yet 
those same authors seem to happily reach for it when faced with the Monty Hall 
problem or the Sleeping Beauty problem—who would dare assign credence 1/17 
to the prize being behind door #1 in the former problem, or allow Beauty to 
assign 1/√2 to ‘today is Monday’ in the latter problem? We converge instead on 
answers dictated by the Principle of Indifference. The fact that the Principle fails 
to hold across the board does not show that it fails across the board. And certain 
cases of free choices may well be cases where it holds. In the middle of a maze, 
you must decide whether to go left or right. Perhaps when starting to deliberate 
about this, it is reasonable for you to assign probability ½ to each option. 
Regarding the quote from Ramsey: I don't see there an argument for the 
DARC Thesis. I take the closest point in the neighborhood to be that evidence 
from the past that may be available to others is unavailable to me:8 for example, 																																																								
6 Thanks to Yoaav Isaacs for the first point, and to Wolfgang Schwarz for the second. 
7 If we regard the Principle of Indifference as a constraint on your priors, then we may 
subsume this point under my discussion of Premise 2.  
8 Even this reading is not immediate. I take it that if any possible present volition of 
ours is (for us) irrelevant to any past event, then by the symmetry of irrelevance—
independence—any past event is irrelevant to any possible present volition of ours (for 
	 13	
from my past behaviour, or from the past behaviour of similar people in similar 
situations. But that falls short of showing that I have no evidence; indeed, 
following Joyce, I may have even better evidence, of a different kind. In any 
case, I think that Ramsey would have been happy assigning subjective 
probabilities even in the absence of evidence. That's exactly what priors are! 
 
5.3 The agent’s authority trumps other evidence (Price) 
Price (2012, 529) writes: “One route to [the DARC] thesis … turns on the 
special epistemic authority of the deliberating agent, concerning her own actions. 
This authority ‘trumps’ any merely predictive knowledge claim about the same 
matters, rendering it necessarily unjustified.” 
I reply: Grant that the deliberating agent has special epistemic authority 
regarding her own actions. Grant that this authority even ‘trumps’ any evidence 
that onlookers might use to ground a credence regarding what she will do. (That 
is how I understand the second sentence. “Knowledge claim” seems a strange 
turn of phrase here—we may assume that nobody knows what the agent will do, 
neither her nor others, in the cases of most interest to us.) But if anything, this 
means that it’s the onlookers who should lack the credences regarding what she 
will do, not the agent herself! After all, they lack the crucial information that the 
agent has—the trump card—which grounds her special epistemic authority. And 
the agent may have such information well before she has decided what she is 
going to do—for example, the initial tickle that she is inclining slightly towards 
the red wine is evidence that only she has.  
The DARC Thesis seems to be counter-supported rather than supported by 
this argument. Having special epistemic authority about a proposition is more 
reason to assign it a credence, not less.  
 
5.4 Incompatible presuppositions about agency (Louise) 
Jennie Louise (2009, 339) canvases the following argument for the DARC 
Thesis. While she does not explicitly endorse it, she does seem to regard it as "a 																																																																																																																																																					
us). Then information about the past does not provide evidence (for us) for what we will 
choose. But if Ramsey had intended to say that, it is surprising that he put the point 
about irrelevance the other way round. 
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real problem … if we think of agency as an all-or-nothing affair" (340). Her 
response is to "think of agency as something that comes in degrees"; by contrast, 
I do not regard it as a real problem even if agency is all-or-nothing. 
  
... it might be argued that while there is no logical incompatibility between 
prediction and deliberation, there is nevertheless a pragmatic 
contradiction—a Moorean paradox… Deliberation about whether to U … 
presupposes agency: that is, it presupposes that I am the kind of creature 
who can be motivated to act in accordance with my perceived reasons. 
Prediction that I will U … on the other hand, seems to presuppose the 
opposite: that I am merely ‘‘an object in the world’’ subject to causal forces 
outside my control.  Using self-prediction in deliberation therefore involves 
the pragmatic contradiction of assuming both that one is an agent and that 
one is not an agent. 
 
I reply: Assuming both that one is an agent and that one is not an agent involves 
a semantic contradiction rather than a pragmatic one, so calling this a “Moorean 
paradox” is an understatement. Rather, the point seems to be that any agent who 
has option-credences must make inconsistent presuppositions. I offer the 
following reading of this argument: 
1. Deliberation about what one will do presupposes one's agency.  
2. Predicting and assigning credences to what one will do presupposes one's 
non-agency. 
Hence, 
3.  Option-credences require one to make incompatible presuppositions, 
which is irrational. 
Conclusion: The DARC Thesis. 
I baulk at 2. Again, it unhappily generalizes to onlookers: their assigning 
credences to what I will do presupposes my non-agency. But why? Why must 
they regard me as merely“an object in the world”subject to causal forces 
outside my control? On the contrary, they may well have a far better 
understanding of the causal forces under my control in virtue of my agency—for 
example, by mentally putting themselves in my shoes. And 2 unhappily 
generalises to my credences about what my future self will do even when I am 
not deliberating about it—unhappily for similar reasons. Once we see all this, we 
also see how it carries over to my own case when I am in the midst of 
deliberation. There is no contradiction—semantic, or otherwise—in my 
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assigning credences to what I will do in virtue of my agency. 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
For all that I have said here and in the previous few sections, 'agency'-based 
arguments have a grip on various of my interlocutors. A common thought is that 
deliberation requires one to take a first-person perspective on oneself, while 
option-credences require one to take a third-person perspective on oneself. One 
cannot adopt both perspectives at the same time, although one may adopt one 
perspective or the other at a given time. It's rather like the way one cannot see 
the duck-rabbit both 'as' a duck and 'as' a rabbit at the same time, the thought 
goes, although it can be seen one way or the other at a given time. Perhaps this 
thought can be dispelled somewhat by noticing that talk of 'perspectives' or 
'seeing as' may be misleading here, suggesting as it does one particular occurrent 
attitude, or phenomenological state, and then another. But like beliefs, credences 
need not be occurrent. You can have a credence without attending to it or being 
aware of it.9  
And there may not be any associated phenomenological state at all. We often 
regard groups as agents, and we often attribute beliefs and even credences to 
them. Groups also make decisions, and deliberate about them. Presumably the 
DARC Thesis should hold for group agents too, if it holds at all. But such agents 
do not have phenomenological states. Indeed, the Thesis seems especially 
implausible for such agents10, perhaps partly for that reason. 
I think that considerations of agency do not support the DARC Thesis, at least 
as far as we have seen so far. But they may support something in the 
neighborhood. More recently, Price has suggested that while deliberating, an 
agent may have credences for what she will choose, but such credences are 
muted—that is, they do no play their usual functional role. In particular, they do 
not play their usual role in guiding her decision.11 They are disengaged from her 
action; deliberating is like a mental 'clutch' with respect to her option-credences. 
That said, it may be difficult to square this view with a functionalist account, 
according to which a credence is identified by its functional role. And even 																																																								
9 Thanks here to Philip Pettit for helpful discussion. 
10 I am grateful to Aidan Lyon for this point. 
11 Price presented this idea in his talk "What Ramsey Got Right", at the Self-Prediction 
and Decision conference, Cambridge University, May 2015. I thank him for very 
helpful discussion on this point, and John Cusbert for the "clutch" metaphor that follows. 
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without subscribing to functionalism, I would like to hear more about what 
option-credences are when they are muted. Furthermore, later we will see quite 
different pictures of deliberation, due to Skyrms and Arntzenius, which portray 
option-credences as central to decision-making; indeed, deliberation is largely 
constituted by the updating of option-credences! We will also see how game 
theory—a theory of decision-making par excellence—appeals to them. So for 
various reasons, we may need them to speak, and speak loudly. 
All that said, muted credences are still credences. So while this proposal may 
be in the neighborhood of the DARC Thesis, it is a retreat from the DARC 
Thesis itself—which is all to the good. 
 
5.5 The argument from vacuity (Levi) 
Isaac Levi is a pragmatist—fittingly for the John Dewey Professor of 
Philosophy Emeritus at Columbia University. The centerpiece of his pragmatism 
is this idea: “Changes in point of view are to be justified by showing that they 
are optimal or, more generally admissible, as options among the available 
options and relative to the goals of the inquiry” (2007, 4). Nobody has defended 
the DARC Thesis in more detail or more famously. It behoves me to present and 
respond to a chief argument of his in detail. 
 To understand Levi's argument, we need a bit of background. Suppose that 
an agent has to choose from a set of options A, and she fully believes that she 
will implement exactly one of them. An 'admissible' option is one that is not 
ruled out by the principles of choice. (Maximizing expected utility is one such 
principle.) 'Serious possibilities' are propositions that are compatible with her 
full beliefs. The 'weak thesis' is that she should judge every hypothesis that says 
that a specific option in A is implemented to be a serious possibility. 
Now, the argument. Here is a key passage in Levi's (2007, 4-5). 
… even on the assumption that credal probabilities are used to compute 
expected values of options and, hence, to determine fair betting rates, the 
argument I offer does not show that the decision maker’s assigning 
unconditional probabilities to hypotheses concerning what the decision maker 
will do is incoherent unless one wants the standards of rationally coherent 
probability judgments to serve in the evaluation of expected value in contexts 
of choice where the principles of choice will sometimes be applicable non 
vacuously. I do want to focus on probability judgment on the assumption that 
principles of choice can be applied non vacuously to the determination of 
which of the available options are admissible and which are not. But my 
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argument does not show that rejecting this assumption is incoherent or 
inconsistent.  
I show that a rational decision maker assigning probabilities to hypotheses 
concerning the option he is about to choose must assign full belief to the 
prediction that the decision maker will choose rationally (i.e., choose an 
admissible option among those judged to be available) on pain of incoherence 
or contradiction. Only admissible options are seriously possible according to 
the decision maker. From this, according to the weak thesis, the admissible 
options and the feasible or available options must coincide. Hence, criteria for 
rational choice must be vacuously applicable in all contexts of choice.  
If this vacuous applicability thesis is rejected, the admissible and the available 
cannot coincide in all contexts of choice. Hence, the criteria for rational 
probability judgment should prohibit a rational decision maker from 
assigning unconditional credal probabilities to hypotheses concerning which 
available option will be chosen on pain of inconsistency with the vacuous 
applicability thesis.  
Let me present what I take the argument to be in 'premise, premise, … 
conclusion' form: 
1. The criteria for rational choice apply non-vacuously in some choice 
contexts. 
2. But when the admissible options and the available options for an agent 
coincide, the criteria for rational choice apply vacuously. 
Hence, 
3. There are choice contexts for an agent in which the admissible options 
and the available options for her do not coincide.  
4. Suppose that there is a rational agent in such a choice context, and 
suppose for reductio that she assigns credences to her choices. 
5. She must be certain that she will choose rationally.  
Hence,  
6. Only admissible options are seriously possible for her. 
Hence, 
7. The admissible options and the available options coincide for her. 
8. This contradicts our supposition in 4. 
Hence, 
Conclusion: no rational agent assigns credences to her choices while 




Premise 2   
Consider a case in which all the agent's options are equally good, and so are tied 
by the lights of her criteria for choice—for example, she has two options, tied in 
expected utility. (The choice between red and white wine could easily be like 
that; it often is for me.) The admissible options and the available options for the 
agent coincide. But the criteria for rational choice apply non-vacuously: she still 
faces a genuine choice. She may, for instance, use a fair coin to make her choice, 
and as a result she assigns credence ½ to each of them (contra the DARC 
Thesis); indeed, she is rationally required to do so if she knows that the coin is 
fair.  
 
Premise 5  
Rational agents who assign credences to their options need not be smug: they 
need not be certain that they are rational. On the contrary, rationality may even 
require them to give positive credence to their not being rational. After all, their 
being rational (or not) is in each case a contingent matter, and as such their 
credence in it should be appropriately responsive to their evidence. Among other 
things, they should realise that they may have misleading evidence regarding 
their rationality. In any case, their evidence is typically not so conclusive as to 
eliminate even the tiniest crack of doubt about their rationality. (Presumably, 
that evidence gives at best inductive support to their rationality.) Moreover, even 
supposing that a rational agent is certain that she is rational now, she need not be 
certain that she will stay rational—typically, her evidence will not settle that 
either. In particular, she might assign some positive credence to her not choosing 
rationally when the moment of choice comes. Indeed, she might not even be 
certain that she will choose at all! 
 
The inference from 5 to 6 
Grant for the sake of argument that the agent is certain that she will choose 
rationally (when the time comes). But she may nonetheless deliberate: to figure 
out what the admissible options are! She is certain that whatever she eventually 
chooses will be admissible, but it takes her a while to determine what that will 
be. And during that time, some inadmissible options are also serious possibilities 
for her; they remain so until she rules them out. So I question the inference here 
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from her being certain that she will choose rationally to her being certain what 
she will rationally choose. And even after she has figured out what the 
admissible options are, she may still want to deliberate—to check what she has 
figured out.  
Perhaps Levi could reply: “I was assuming that the agent is ideally rational, 
so she takes no time to figure out what the admissible options are—she sees 
them immediately”. But then she does not deliberate! Then the thesis isn’t really 
‘deliberation crowds out prediction (for rational agents)’; instead, it’s ‘rationality 
crowds out deliberation’!12 
 
The inference from 6 to 7 
The natural reading of an option's being “available” for her is that she is able 
to perform it. Levi uses the word “feasible” interchangeably with “available”, 
which only reinforces this reading to my ear. But then 7 does not follow from 6. 
Even when you are certain that you will not perform a given action, you may 
well be able to perform it. Even when you are certain that you will choose the 
red wine, you are still able to choose the white. (And even a shot of petrol, for 
that matter.) 
Levi must be using the word "available" in a doxastic sense: an option is 
"available" if your choosing it is compatible with your full beliefs. In that sense, 
the white wine is no longer "available" once you have decided to choose the red 
(and perhaps the shot of petrol never was). But then premise 2 seems less 
plausible to me, for another reason. When you have made up your mind not to 
choose various options, so that they're "unavailable" in Levi's sense—even 
though you are still able to choose them—the criteria for rational choice may 
still apply non-vacuously, confirming that you're doing the right thing. (For 
example, drinking the red wine really has higher expected value than the white 
for you after all.) 
 
The validity of the argument 																																																								
12 Cf. Stalnaker (1991, 428-429): "Deliberation, to the extent that it is thought of as a 
rational process of figuring out what one should do given one's priorities and 
expectations is an activity that is unnecessary for the deductively omniscient. In fact any 
kind of information processing or computation is unintelligible as an activity of a 
deductively omniscient agent." 
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This argument (and indeed various other arguments for the DARC Thesis) 
does not rule out one's having credences for some but not all of one's options. 
This seems especially to be a live possibility when one has several options. Why 
can't one have a partial credence function, defined on some of the options but 
not others? Yet the conclusion of Levi's argument rules that out too, and it is 
thus stronger than the argument for it supports, as far as I can see. 
In any case, the argument does not support the full DARC Thesis ("no 
rational agent assigns credences to her choices while deliberating about 
them")—just the restriction of it to choice contexts for an agent in which the 
admissible options and the available options for her do not coincide. As we have 
seen, there are contexts in which they do coincide—even non-vacuous ones, in 
which all one's options are equally good. 
Finally, I wonder how to square the DARC Thesis with Levi's pragmatism—
recall its centerpiece in the “Changes in point of view” quote, above. Consider a 
case in which you have credences for a choice further in the future, but you are 
not yet deliberating about it—say, next Tuesday's meal. When you begin 
deliberating about that choice, your credences are supposed to vanish according 
to Levi. And having completed the deliberation, the credences may reappear 
(presumably as 1 to what you will actually do and 0 to everything else). That 
involves two “changes in point of view”. But I wonder how you—or Levi—
could justify them by showing that they are “optimal or, more generally 
admissible”. 
 
5.6 Betting rates collapse (Levi) 
In another of his arguments for the DARC Thesis, Levi (2007) identifies 
credences with fair betting rates. For example, your credence that it will rain 
tomorrow is 0.7 if and only if 70 cents is your fair betting price for a bet that 
pays $1 just in case it rains. 
Levi turns to the specific problem of an agent having a choice between two 
options, a and b, with a strictly preferred to b; he imagines that she has 
credences for these options, and that she uses these credences to determine fair 
betting rates for bets on whether a or b will be chosen. He shows that the only 
admissible option is to choose a and to regard the fair betting rate for her doing 
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so to be 1 (and 0 for choosing b). Fair betting prices for one’s options collapse to 
0 and 1.  
I reply: The problem is not with the agent assigning credences to her choices, 
but rather with the identification of credences with fair betting rates. This 
identification founders especially on cases in which the placement of the bet 
interferes with the proposition bet on. For example, I am highly confident that I 
will fall asleep tonight: I do so every night (eventually). But now suppose that I 
have placed a bet that will pay a million dollars just in case I fall asleep tonight. 
That very fact will make my credence that I will fall asleep tonight drop sharply. 
I picture myself at 5 a.m. pounding my pillow, working myself up into a panic:
“Quick! Fall asleep! Fall asleep!!”And betting on which option one will 
choose is another such case—it interferes with the proposition bet on.  
In fact, I take it that elsewhere Levi himself does not subscribe to the 
identification of credences with fair betting rates. He rejects the diachronic 
Dutch Book argument for conditionalisation, according to which a non-
conditionaliser will be susceptible to sure losses on bets that she considers fair. 
Levi (1988) replies that the agent will see the sure loss coming, and so will not 
take all the requisite bets. But that is to reject the betting analysis. 
 
5.7 Betting rates cannot be applied (Spohn) 
I mentioned earlier that Spohn's version of the DARC Thesis focuses on the 
credences for acts in decision models, and soon I will countenance an argument 
of his that is explicitly about such models. However, as I also mentioned, I take 
him also to be a proponent of the DARC Thesis itself—an early and important 
one—and so do other authors (e.g., Rabinowicz 2002). Moreover, some of 
Spohn's arguments are not confined to considerations about decision models. For 
example, in his (1977, 115) he writes: 
It is generally acknowledged that subjective probabilities manifest 
themselves in the readiness to accept bets with appropriate betting odds and 
small stakes. Hence, a probability for an act should manifest itself in the 
readiness to accept a bet on that act, if the betting odds are high enough. Of 
course, this is not the case. The agent’s readiness to accept a bet on an act 
does not depend on the betting odds, but only on his gain. If the gain is 
high enough to put this act on the top of his preference order of acts, he will 
accept it, and if not, not. 
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I understand the argument as follows: 
1. The attractiveness of a bet on one’s act depends only on the difference 
between the bet’s prize and its price. [This can be shown with a bit of work—see 
Rabinowicz (2002), which has helped my understanding of this argument.] 
In particular, 
2. The bet’s attractiveness does not depend on the agent’s fair betting rate. 
Hence,  
3. The notion of a fair betting rate cannot be applied to a bet on one’s act. 
4. Credences are fair betting rates. 
Hence, 
Conclusion: The DARC Thesis. 
I reply:  
Nowhere does deliberation enter into this argument. So it should apply equally 
to your future acts that you are not deliberating about. Be that as it may, again 
we should reject the identification of credences with fair betting rates, premise 4. 
 
5.8 There is no decision-theoretic role for option-credences (Spohn) 
Finally, I turn to an argument of Spohn's (1977) that explicitly concerns 
option-credences in decision models, but that implicitly supports the DARC 
Thesis itself; indeed, I regard it as one of the most interesting arguments for the 
Thesis. (Levi 2007 has a similar argument, with acknowledgment to Spohn.) 
Spohn writes: 
probabilities for acts play no role in decision making. For, what only 
matters in a decision situation is how much the decision maker likes the 
various acts available to him, and relevant to this, in turn, is what he 
believes to result from the various acts and how much he likes these results. 
At no place does there enter any subjective probability for an act. The 
decision maker chooses the act he likes most – be its probability as it may. 
But if this is so, there is no sense in imputing probabilities for acts to the 
decision maker. For one could tell neither from his actual choices nor from 
his preferences what they are. Now, decision models are designed to 
capture just the decision maker's cognitive and motivational dispositions 
expressed by subjective probability and utilities which manifest 
themselves in and can be guessed from his choices and preferences.  
Probabilities for acts, if they exist at all, are not of this sort, as just seen, 
and therefore should not be contained in decision models. (115).  
 
The key premise here is: 
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Probabilities for acts play no role in decision making. 
The explicit conclusion here is: 
Conclusion: Probability for acts should not be contained in decision models. 
The final sentence seems to leave open the possibility that probabilities for acts 
exist, as far as this argument goes. However, I take it that Spohn intends to close 
off that possibility with his betting argument (see §5.7 above), which concerns 
credences themselves—rather than decision models—and which immediately 
follows this argument in his paper.13 And recall the quote in which he expresses 
such scepticism for the notion of credences for things under one's control as to 
call it "absurd".  
Regarding the key premise, I reply: Probabilities for acts play no role in 
Savage's decision theory, but they do in some other decision theories. Taken at 
face value, Jeffrey’s (1983) evidential decision theory requires probabilities for 
acts. After all, its formula for expected utility of an act A is a weighted average 
of utilities associated with A across a partition of states {Si}, the weights given 
by conditional probabilities of the form P(Si | A). And he understands these 
conditional probabilities in terms of the usual ratio formula: P(Si & A)/P(A). To 
be sure, I would prefer understanding them as primitive conditional probabilities 
instead. Be that as it may, the usual reading of evidential decision theory has a 
role for option-credences.  
It seems that causal decision theory also requires option-credences. Consider 
a case in which you take propositions about what you will do to be correlated 
with dependency hypotheses (Lewis 1981), or their analogues in other versions 
of causal decision theory. (See Gibbard and Harper 1978 and Egan 2007 for 
such cases.) Then, if you don't have option-credences, you cannot have 
credences in the relevant dependency hypotheses, and hence cannot assign 
causal expected utilities to the relevant options.14 
Moreover, probabilities for acts play a crucial role in Arntzenius's (2008) 
'deliberational decision theory', which is inspired by Skyrms's 'deliberational 
dynamics' (1990)—more on those shortly. And Hare and Hedden (forthcoming) 																																																								
13 I have reversed their order so that Spohn's betting argument immediately followed 
Levi's above, and to provide a natural segue to the theoretical roles for option-credences 
below. 
14 Thanks here to Brian Hedden. 
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argue that in certain decision problems, one needs to assign low credence to 
one's taking a manifestly bad option in order to get the right results. To be fair, 
Spohn's paper predates these works. Still, they may be regarded as existence 
proofs that option-credences may play a central role in decision models after all. 
In any case, credences have other theoretical roles besides their role in 
decision models. Indeed, I would have thought that their primary role is to codify 
uncertainty. That uncertainty may be parlayed into rational decision-making, but 
it is more fundamental. It may be parlayed elsewhere, too—for example, into 
confirmation relations, inference, and in connections to binary belief (for 
example, via the Lockean Thesis, or some other bridge between credence and 
belief). In short, even if probabilities for acts play no role in decision theory, that 
doesn’t mean that they play no useful theoretical role. Soon we will see more 
such roles that they play.  
Furthermore, even if option-credences play no role in decision theory, it does 
not follow that they do not exist. Edward Elliott (MS, 6) puts the point well, 
arguing that this form of reasoning proves too much (his discussion concerns 
Savage's decision theory): 
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The strongest argument for [the DARC] thesis seems to be that credences 
regarding which action will be chosen in the present circumstances play no 
role in rational decision-making … Even supposing that this is true, it is 
quite different than the thought that we simply do not have such credences. 
Utilities for events also play no role in decision-making either, according to 
the orthodoxy—by hypothesis, what event obtains is independent of the 
choice between acts, so any valuation of the events on the subject’s behalf 
is regarded as irrelevant to her choice. It would be unreasonable to infer 
from this that we do not have utilities for events; at least, it certainly seems 
to me that I am able to judge which of two events I would rather be true, 
even if I know that this is entirely beyond my control. 
 
Coming from the other side, there are also theoretical costs to the DARC 
Thesis’s prohibition of option-credences. It introduces a new necessity15—the 
avoidance of option credences, on pain of irrationality—and this complicates our 
epistemology and decision theory. Of course, some theoretical costs are worth 
paying—one should not cut oneself on Ockham's razor. For all I have said, the 
distinction may earn its keep. Still, the case for the DARC Thesis from 
theoretical considerations must take all this into account. 
There is also the problem that the DARC Thesis is in tension with other 
putative rationality principles. I have already mentioned its tension with 
conditionalization (and Jeffrey conditionalization), with the Reflection Principle 
(§4), and with the Principle of Indifference (§5.2). Moreover, according to the 
Principal Principle, your credence in a proposition, conditional on the chance of 
that proposition having a particular value, should be that value.16 Imagine that 
you learn the chance that you will choose a particular option while deliberating 
about it—this seems like a coherent possibility. By the Principal Principle, you 
are required to make that your credence, and in particular required not to have a 
credence gap for that option. The DARC Thesis and the Principal Principle then 
collide—and you can guess which one I side with!  
More generally, following Gaifman (1988) we call Q an expert function for 
you if your credence function P is constrained by: 
 P(X | Q(X) = p) = p (provided P(Q(X) = p) > 0). 
Roughly, you align your credences with what you take your expert's 
probabilities to be. Chance is just one expert function for you. According to the 																																																								15	I thank James Chase for this way of putting the point. 
16 That’s not quite what the Principle says (see Lewis 1980 for its proper statement), but 
close enough for my purposes here. 
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Reflection Principle, your credence function at a future time is another. 
According to Rational Reflection (Christensen 2010), the evidential probability 
function is another (when conditionalised on your evidence). Or you may have 
more specialised experts—for example, a metereologist with respect to the 
probability of rain. The DARC Thesis collides with your knowing the 
probability assignment of any expert for you regarding what you will do, while 
you are deliberating about that. For by your own lights, you are supposed to 
align your probability assignment with that of your expert, while the DARC 
Thesis forbids you to have any assignment at all. 
But this still understates the case for allowing option-credences. It isn't just 
that forbidding them may have some unwanted theoretical consequences; 
allowing them has some genuine theoretical benefits. I believe that they earn 
their theoretical keep, and then some. 
 
6. Theoretical roles for option-credences 
I have already mentioned some theoretical benefits of positing option-
credences. That's just the start. 
Option-credences also play an important role in game theory. They are 
appealed to in the notion of correlated equilibrium, at least as it is standardly 
presented. A more general solution concept than that of Nash equilibrium, we 
are to imagine each player choosing her action on the basis of a signal that is 
observed by all the players. Common knowledge is assumed of all the players' 
probabilities for performing each of their possible actions; this includes each 
player's probabilities of performing her own possible actions. 
Trembling hand equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium that takes 
into account the possibility of off-equilibrium play, through an unintentional slip 
or 'trembling hand'. The players' probabilities of such actions are supposed to be 
negligible, but again common knowledge; and again, they include each players' 
probabilities of her own trembles. 
Option-credences are also central to Skyrms's (1990) deliberational dynamics. 
The idea is that deliberation is a dynamic process in which an agent repeatedly 
revises her credences in her options. She begins in a state of indecision, with a 
set of credences over her options. She calculates their expected utilities on the 
basis of those credences. She then increases her credence in each option whose 
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expected utility is greater than the status quo. And so it goes, her option-
credences evolving until at the moment of decision the probability for the chosen 
action becomes virtually 1. Skyrms uses deliberational dynamics to model 
phenomena as diverse as the arms race, the emergence of conventions, and the 
social contract. Bartha (2012) uses it to model one's evolving credences when 
faced with many theistic hypotheses, à la the 'many Gods' objection to Pascal's 
Wager. And Bartha, Barker, and Hájek (2013) apply it to 'Satan's apple', a 
decision puzzle due to Arntzenius, Elga and Hawthorne (2004). 
Arntzenius's (2008) deliberational decision theory is inspired by Skyrms's 
deliberational dynamics. He understands a 'mixed decision'—a decision to 
perform one's possible actions with specified probabilities—as having those 
probabilities at the end of rational deliberation. The agent iteratively updates her 
option-credences, Skyrms-style, until eventually they reach an equilibrium—
though they may not be anywhere near extremal at that point. So, far from 
deliberation crowding out option credences, it is largely constituted by such 
credences. Indeed, deliberation is characterised in terms of them: it terminates 
when they reach an equilibrium. Deliberational decision theory can be given 
both an evidential and a causal formulation. If the expected utilities are causal, 
we have 'deliberational causal decision theory'; if they are evidential, we have 
'deliberational evidential decision theory'. Arntzenius advocates deliberational 
causal decision theory, and he argues that it can solve some apparent 
'counterexamples' to causal decision theory.  
Both Skyrms and Arntzenius appeal to deliberational dynamics to unify 
decision theory and game theory. Skyrms notes the somewhat puzzling fact that 
while decision theorists insist that rational decision-making is always a matter of 
maximizing expected utility, game theorists cast it instead in terms of various 
equilibrium concepts (Nash, correlated, trembling hand, and so on). He shows 
that by taking deliberation to be a dynamic process, expected utility 
maximization can be taken as fundamental, and the various game-theoretic 
solution concepts as derived from it—they correspond to different kinds of 




I like gaps. I am intrigued by the idea that there can be blindspots for various 
propositional attitudes. I have championed the existence of gaps for rational 
credences, and I have marshaled them to argue that various basic probabilistic 
notions need to be rethought. This, in turn, forces us to rethink important parts of 
formal epistemology. 
The DARC Thesis, if true, would provide me with more ammunition for my 
dark theses about the current state of play in these areas. Probability gaps would 
be as mundane as choosing red wine over white, or a holiday to Italy over one to 
Iraq. They would arise every time a rational agent deliberates about what to do. 
But I can't in good conscience help myself to these putative credence gaps. Not 
only am I unconvinced by the arguments for the DARC Thesis; I believe there 
are strong reasons to reject it outright. 
Now that I'm done with this paper, I'll reward myself with a glass of wine. 
Now that you've finished reading it, you might want to do so too. I'm highly 
confident, but not certain, that I'll choose the red. How about you? 
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